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EVIDENCE-FORMER TESTIMONY EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
POSES UNEXPECTED HAZARDS TO PARENTS WHO TESTIFY IN JUVENILE
COURT PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS. HAMBLEN V. STATE, 44 Ark. App.
54 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hamblen v. State,' the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that
testimony given by a witness in a probable cause hearing in juvenile court
is later admissible in a criminal trial stemming from the same matter when
the witness is unavailable to testify at the criminal trial pursuant to Rule
804(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the former testimony
exception to the hearsay rule for unavailable witnesses.2 By holding that
testimony in juvenile custody proceedings properly falls within the former
testimony exception to the hearsay rule, the court arguably reached a
different result than that reached in Scott v. State,3 a decision widely cited
as the principal Arkansas case on the hearsay exception to the former
testimony of an unavailable witness.4 Therefore, the Hamblen court's
holding appears to expand the use of prior statements by an unavailable
witness to a degree not contemplated by the court in Scott.
This casenote examines the state of Rule 804(b)(1) in the wake of
Hamblen v. State. It begins with a description of the facts of the case in
Part I. In Part II, the note summarizes the legal context in which the
Hamblen case was decided. Part III analyzes the court's reasoning in
Hamblen. Then, Part IV explores the significance of the case. Finally, the
note concludes that one may not be able to reconcile Hamblen v. State with
Scott v. State.
1. 44 Ark. App. 54, 866 S.W.2d 119 (1993).
2. Id. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. The court held that prior testimony in a civil hearing
is admissible in a subsequent criminal trial, even when the accused is not represented by
counsel at the preliminary hearing and did not cross-examine witnesses. Id.
3. 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110 (1981). In Scott, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that former testimony provided in a preliminary hearing of a criminal nature was not
admissible in the subsequent criminal trial, even when all parties were represented by
counsel. Scott, 272 Ark. at 95, 6i2 S.W.2d at 113-14.
4. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 824 P.2d 1023, 1029 n.4 (N.M. 1992) (citing Scott as
authority for a case-by-case analysis of the admissibility of former testimony at subsequent
criminal trials); Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1985) (adopting Scott's case-
by-case approach); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 434 N.E.2d 163, 171 (Mass. 1982) (same
as Gonzales); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 601 (1988) (quoting Scott to support the proposition that
preliminary hearing testimony can rarely produce substantially the same cross-examination
as would be produced at trial).
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II. FACTS
On October 27, 1991, Larry Daniel Hamblen took his five-week old
son, Kendall, to the emergency room at Methodist Hospital in Jonesboro.'
The child had multiple bruises on his arms and palms, the bones above his
left ankle were broken, and his right leg was broken.6 Kendall also had an
older fracture of the clavicle bone, but it was n~arly healed.7 Furthermore,
Kendall's brain was beginning to swell.8
On October 28, 1991, the Juvenile Division of the Craighead County
Chancery Court entered an emergency custody order placing Kendall in the
custody of the Division of Children and Family Services (DCFS).9 On or
about October 28, Larry Daniel Hamblen was charged with first degree
battery and permitting abuse of a child."
On October 30, 1991, the chancery court held a hearing to determine
if probable cause existed to continue the October 28 emergency order
placing the child with DCFS; consequently, it set a hearing date to
determine whether the child was dependent-neglected." Present at the
5. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. At 55, 866 S.W.2d at 119-20.
6. Id. at 55, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
7. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 3, Hamblen v. State, 44 Ark. App. 54, 866
S.W.2d 119 (1993) (No. CACR-92-01216).
8. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 55, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
9. Id. at 56, 866 S.W.2d at 120. The court relied on ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-314,
which provides:
(a) In any case where there is probable cause to believe a juvenile is
dependent-neglected or in need of services and that immediate
emergency custody is necessary to protect the health or physical well-
being of the juvenile from immediate danger or to prevent the
juvenile's removal from the state, the court shall issue an ex parte
order for emergency custody to remove the juvenile from the custody
of the parent, guardian, or custodian and shall determine the
appropriate plan for placement of the juvenile.
(b) The emergency order shall include:
(1)Notice to the juvenile's parents, custodian, or guardian of the right
to a hearing and that a hearing will be held within five (5) business
days of the issuance of the ex parte order;
(2)Their right to be represented by counsel;
(3)Their right to obtain appointed counsel if indigent, and the
procedure for obtaining appointed counsel; and
(4)The location and telephone number of the court, and the procedure
for obtaining a hearing.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-314 (Michie 1991), amended by Act of March 7, 1995, No. 533, §
4.
10. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 55, 866 S.W.2d at 119.
11. Id. at 56, 866 S.W.2d at 120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(h)(2) requires that proof
by a preponderance be established for a child to be adjudicated dependent-neglected. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(h)(2) (Michie 1991), amended by Acts of March 7, 1995, No. 533,
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hearing were Larry D. Hamblen and Kendall's mother, Donna Reams.' 2
Neither Hamblen nor Reams were represented by counsel. 3 Hamblen had
been previously denied indigent status because he was employed full-time
at minimum wage.'4 The Chancellor advised Hamblen of his right to
counsel, which he stated he understood, and Reams expressed her desire to
proceed with the hearing pro se. 5 Hamblen expressed that he wanted to
proceed without representation as well.'6 The Chancellor then advised both
parties of their right not to testify and that any testimony they gave could
be used against them in the criminal proceedings then pending. 7 Both
Hamblen and Reams expressed their understanding of the judge's admoni-
tions.' 8
During the hearing, Reams testified that she observed Hamblen shake
Kendall on several occasions. 9 Further, she testified that she and Hamblen
were the child's only caregivers and that the injuries had to occur while the
child was in their care.20 She also testified that Hamblen had a bad temper,
but that in their two years of living together he had never hit her.2'
Following her testimony, the Chancellor asked Hamblen if he had any
questions of Reams and he replied, "I had one a while ago, but I done
forgot."'22
Prior to Hamblen's criminal trial, Reams notified the circuit court and
the prosecutor that she would exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to
testify.23 The State then gave notice that it intended to use Reams's sworn
testimony at the juvenile court hearing as evidence against Hamblen at the
§ 6.
12. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 56, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
13. Id. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
14. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 4, Hamblen (No. CACR 92-01216).
15. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 120-21.
18. Id. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 121.
19. Id.
20. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 82, Hamblen (No. CACR 92-01216).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 58, 866 S.W.2d at 121; see also United States v.
Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 792 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness who invokes Fifth
Amendment rights is "unavailable" for the purposes of admitting former testimony pursuant
to FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)).
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criminal trial.24 At trial, the circuit court entered the statement into evidence
21over Hamblen's objections.
Hamblen appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, claiming the
circuit court erred in admitting Reams's statement into evidence.26 Hamblen
based his appeal on Scott v. State in which the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that a preliminary criminal hearing with a limited transcript and a bare
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses did not comply with the Sixth
Amendment's confrontation clause.27  The Arkansas Court of Appeals
nevertheless affirmed Hamblen's conviction, holding that the evidence
presented in the juvenile court hearing and submitted at trial met the
"reliability" test used by the United States Supreme Court in California v.
Green.2" The court determined that Reams's testimony was given at a
hearing not significantly different from an actual trial, rather than the more
limited hearing at issue in Scott,29 and that Hamblen had the opportunity and
24. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 58, 866 S.W.2d at 121. The prosecution gave this notice
pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-210 (Michie 1987), which provides:
(a) If any witness fails to enter into the recognizance required by § 16-85-208,
or if the magistrate, from the proceedings had before him, or from testimony
on oath, has reasonable grounds to believe that any witness who has entered
into recognizance may nevertheless not appear and testify at the trial of the
cause, the witness shall be examined on behalf of the state of the defendant
on application made for that purpose.
(1)The examination shall be preceded by notice to the other party and
shall be by question and answer in the presence of the defendant and
the prosecuting attorney or his deputy or other attorney for the
prosecution, with opportunity given for cross-examination, and the
testimony given shall be transcribed in writing.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-210 (Michie 1987) (emphasis added).
25. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 66, Hamblen (No. CACR 92-01216).
26. Id. at 84.
27. 272 Ark. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 114. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that all persons who have been criminally accused shall have the right
to confront the witnesses against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. In California v. Green, the
United States Supreme Court first articulated the modern test to determine when prior
statements of an unavailable witness can later be admissible in a criminal trial. 399 U.S.
149, 165 (1970). Such testimony must possess "indicia of reliability" in order to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
29. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. The custody hearing was
conducted in Juvenile Court pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325, which provided many
of the same procedural safeguards found in criminal proceedings. The statute stated:
(d) The court shall be a court of record. A record of all proceedings
shall be kept in the same manner as other proceedings of chancery
court and in accordance with rules promulgated by the Arkansas
Supreme Court.
(e) Unless otherwise indicated, the Arkansas Rules of Evidence shall apply.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter and until rules of
procedure for juvenile court are developed and in effect, the Arkansas
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a similar motive to develop testimony at the preliminary hearing as he had
at the criminal trial.3" Thus, the court concluded that the trial court properly
admitted Reams's hearsay testimony when she was later unavailable to
testify.3
III. BACKGROUND
A. Hearsay Rule Analysis
The Hamblen court admitted Reams's prior testimony pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), which establishes the requirements for
the use of prior testimony of an unavailable declarant. a2 Rule 804(b)(1)
requires that a defendant have an opportunity and similar motive to develop
testimony at the preliminary hearing as he or she would have at trial. 3 The
federal courts operate under the same rule.34
Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings and the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to delinquency
proceedings.
(g) All defendants shall have the right to compel attendance of witnesses
in accordance with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325 (Michie 1987), amended by Act of March 7, 1995, No. 533, §
6.
See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-314 and supra note 10 for additional procedural
requirements applicable to probable cause hearings in juvenile court where the issue of a
child's dependent-neglected status is determined.
30. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. Hearsay is defined in Rule 801
of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence as "an oral or written assertion made by one [other than]
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." ARK. R. EvID. 801. This rule mirrors the corresponding federal
provision. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
Likewise, Arkansas's former testimony exception is identical to Rule 804(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 804(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides that
the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding,
if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.
ARK R. EvID. 804(b)(1) (emphasis added).
31. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. "Unavailable" for court
testimony, of course, is a legal term that includes situations, like this one, where a witness
does not testify on the basis of a legally provided privilege not to testify.
32. ARK. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
33. Id.
34. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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Federal courts construing the language in Rule 804(b)(1) have held that
the "opportunity" requirement in the rule does not mandate that the party
seeking to exclude the former testimony must have exercised the opportu-
nity.35 If defense counsel makes a tactical decision not to cross-examine the
declarant at the prior hearing, the defense may be prevented from excluding
that testimony at a subsequent trial on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.36 The opportunity to develop
prior testimony for the purposes of this hearsay exception, however, is not
established merely by the presence of counsel. 7 If the former testimony
was given under circumstances -where the defendant had inadequate time to
prepare a cross-examination, or where the defendant's presence was not
required, then the fact the defendant did attend the prior hearing does not in
itself establish adequate opportunity to develop the testimony of the
declarant." Factors that determine when the opportunity requirement is met
include: the nature of the former tribunal and the extent to which it permits
or restricts cross-examination, the amount of notice given to the defendant
at the prior hearing, and the nature of the cross-examination itself.39
The "similar motive" element of Rule 804(b)(1) must also be satisfied
in order for the former testimony of an unavailable declarant to be
admissible in a later" proceeding.' The rule requires that the factual issue
for which the former testimony was offered be similar to that for which it
is offered at the subsequent trial at which the declarant is unavailable.4'
This provision does not require that the issues present an identical motive,
35. United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 793 (1st Cir. 1979).
36. Id.
37. United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258 (6th Cir. 1992).
38. Id. In Taplin, the Sixth Circuit overturned Collin Taplin's drug conviction. The
conviction had been founded substantially on evidence presented by a co-conspirator in a
suppression hearing at which Taplin's presence was not required. Id. The hearing was to
determine whether Bailey had standing to join Taplin's motion to suppress evidence
recovered during their arrest. Id. Although Taplin did attend the hearing, the Sixth Circuit
held that mere presence did not constitute "opportunity" when the hearing at which the prior
testimony sought to be admitted was not one involving the "defendant qua defendant." Id.
The Sixth Circuit declared that "[o]pportunity under 804(b)(1) means more than naked
opportunity." Id.
39. See Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from
an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1079, 1097-98 (1987) (analyzing the Rule 804
hearsay exceptions).
40. ARK. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
41. See Weissenberger, supra note 39, at 1101-02.
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merely a similar one.42 The similar motive requirement is met if the two
proceedings present a substantial similarity of issues.43
B. Confrontation Clause Analysis
Any use of prior testimony in a criminal proceeding that satisfies the
requirements in Rule 804(b)(1) must also satisfy constitutional requirements
imposed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
However, this right has never been held to mandate a literal confrontation
at the trial in which the defendant is convicted.45
In Mattox v. United States, a criminal defendant was convicted at his
second criminal trial based in part upon testimony given by two witnesses
at his first trial who died before the second trial began.' Both of these
witnesses had been duly sworn and cross-examined at the first trial. 47 The
Court reasoned that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was preserved
when the testimony from prior witnesses was subject to cross-examination s
and that admission of such testimony is needed to serve the interests of
justice.49 Although the Court cited a considerable body of law to support
its holding,5" the Court was careful to frame the holding as an exception to
the criminal defendant's protected right to an adversarial proceeding.5'
Seventy years later, the United States Supreme Court made the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause protections applicable to the states
42. See Weissenberger, supra note 39, at 1101-02.
43. See Weissenberger, supra note 39, at 1101-02. When, however, the issue at a
preliminary hearing is the privacy of a co-conspirator, and the issue at trial is the defendant's
guilt or innocence, the defendant does not have a similar motive to develop testimony at the
preliminary hearing to the extent that he has at his criminal trial. Taplin, 954 F.2d at 1259.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to... be confronted with the witnesses against him ... .
45. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
46. Id. at 240.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 242-43. The Mattox decision often has been quoted to describe the purpose
of the Confrontation Clause:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were... used against the prisoner in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.
49. Id. at 244.
50. Id. at 240-42.
51. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
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through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In Pointer
v. Texas, the Court held that the testimony of a co-defendant presented at
a preliminary hearing was inadmissible in the subsequent criminal trial
where the defendant had no lawyer and therefore had no adequate opportu-
nity to cross-examine witnesses. 3 The Pointer Court equated confrontation
with cross-examination and held that the Confrontation Clause was violated
when the defendant had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
witness whose testimony was later used against him.' The Court expressly
stated, however, that it would reach a different result if the prior statement
sought to be admitted had been taken at a "full-fledged hearing."55
In later cases, the Supreme Court has not required the death of the
witness in order to admit the prior testimony. The Court has held that the
witnesses must simply be unavailable for the later trial.5 6 In Barber v. Page,
the Court held that prior testimony was inadmissible when the prosecution
did not make good faith efforts to secure the presence of the witness whose
prior testimony was sought to be admitted, even when the prior testimony
was subject to a full cross-examination. 7 In dicta, the Court suggested that
it would possibly uphold the admissibility of prior testimony given at a
preliminary hearing when the witness is actually unavailable and when the
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 8
In California v. Green, prior testimony subject to cross-examination
was admitted at trial to impeach the current testimony of the same witness."
52. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
53. Id. at 407-08.
54. Id. at 405 ("There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts
have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.").
55. Id. at 407. Here, the Court opened the door for upholding the use of prior
testimony in a criminal proceeding when the testimony was garnered under two conditions:
(1) When the defendant was represented by counsel, and (2) the witness was actually
subjected to a "complete and adequate opportunity" to cross-examine. The Court did not so
hold until California v. Green in 1972. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
56. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
57. Id. at 725. See also Satterfield v. State, 248 Ark. 395, 451 S.W.2d 730 (1970)
(holding that the prosecutor must make a good faith effort to obtain a witness at trial before
the witness is considered unavailable for purposes of the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule).
58. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725-26. In what may be termed a lukewarm adoption of this
idea, the Court stated "there may be some justification" for such a holding. Id. Given this
reception, it is unclear if the Court was prepared to hold that a possible co-defendant who
pleaded the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination would be "unavailable" for
the purpose of admitting prior testimony from a preliminary hearing, as was the case in
Hamblen.
59. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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Although this case did not consider the situation where testimony is later
admitted because the witness is unavailable, it did discuss the circumstances
under which earlier testimony can later be admitted and still satisfy the
demands of the Confrontation Clause.' In this case, the proffered testimony
was given under the following circumstances: (1) the declarant gave the
former testimony under oath; (2) the defendant was represented by counsel
at the preliminary hearing; (3) the defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the preliminary hearing; and (4) the declarant's
statements sought to be admitted were taken before a judicial tribunal that
maintained a record of the proceedings.6 The Court held that testimony
taken under these circumstances would be admissible even if the witness had
been unavailable for trial.62
In his dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that preliminary hearings are
sufficiently different from trial as to preclude meaningful confrontation.63
He asserted that the issues presented at the two hearings are vastly
different--the hearing seeks to determine whether probable cause exists to
proceed with trial; trial seeks to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
He expressed the concern that probable cause hearings are rarely more than
uncontested proceedings in which the outcome is certain and the defense has
valid reasons not to cross-examine the State's witnesses for fear of revealing
its theory of defense and giving the State free discovery.65 Consequently,
he feared that it would be possible for a defendant to be convicted wholly
on evidence presented at a preliminary hearing that, for tactical reasons, was
not contested at the hearing.66
By 1980, the United States Supreme Court's approach to determining
the admissibility of prior testimony under the Confrontation Clause had
evolved into a two-pronged analysis.67 First, the Court inquires into whether
the testimony was previously given by one who is now unavailable for
60. Id. at 165.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Brennan saw a distinction between
a witness who is physically unavailable to testify and one who pleads their rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 202. He challenged the reliability of the former testimony in the
latter situation, as he saw the witness as seeking to incriminate another while avoiding cross-
examination at a criminal trial. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 200 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
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UALR LAW JOURNAL
trial.68 "Unavailability" requires that the prosecution make good faith efforts
to secure the presence of the witness,69 or make a showing that, because of
the weight of the other evidence against the defendant, such efforts are not
likely to result in producing a witness of more than peripheral significance.7"
Second, the Court examines whether the offered testimony bears sufficient
"indicia of reliability" to enable the trial court to place the testimony before
the jury without a literal confrontation at trial,7 or whether the testimony
gives the trier of fact "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement. 72  Examples of "indicia of reliability" include: (1) the
extent to which the statement is spontaneous or against the penal interests
of the person making the statement; 73 (2) whether the declarant was under
oath; (3) whether the defendant was represented by counsel at the prior
hearing; (4) whether the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness; and (5) whether the proceedings were conducted before a tribunal
equipped to prepare a record of the proceedings. 74 The United States
Supreme Court has asserted that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
"to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process . ...
68. Id.; see also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211-13 (1972) (holding that a prior
witness who was a permanent resident of Sweden and was therefore beyond the subpoena
power of the state court was unavailable for the purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis).
69. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
70. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 71, 87 (1970).
71. Id. at 89.
72. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
73. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
74. Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
75. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. This view of the Confrontation Clause, one guaranteeing
the reliability of evidence used in criminal trials, has been severely criticized by some
commentators. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557 (1988). The author posits that modern interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause removes it from among the substantive provisions of the Bill of
Rights and renders it "a minor adjunct to evidence law." Id. at 558. He asserts that the
Sixth Amendment constitutionalized the adversary system, and, although we might believe
that accuracy in the truth-determining process is one of the benefits of the adversary system,
it is not the right to accurate truth determination but rather the right to confrontation of
witnesses endemic to the adversary system that is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at 585. He concludes that, when examining Confrontation Clause issues, courts should
study whether the practice at issue unconstitutionally infringes on our adversary system, not
whether the practice furthers or hinders the accuracy of the ultimate verdict. Id. at 586.
Using the Dutton view of the Confrontation Clause, the Seventh Circuit distinguished
between testimony that would be admissible under the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule (that which contains "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"), and
testimony that would be permissible by the Confrontation Clause (that which possesses
"adequate indicia of reliability"). United States v. Mokol, 939 F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1991).
The court, however, refrained from articulating the precise contours of the distinction. Id.
[Vol. 1 8
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Prior to Hamblen v. State, Arkansas's treatment of this constitutional
issue reflected a concern for the issues Justice Brennan raised in his dissent
in California v. Green.76 In Scott v. State, " the circuit judge admitted into
evidence a transcript of a preliminary hearing held in Little Rock Municipal
Court in which Cherylinda Ford testified that the defendants were felons in
possession of firearms on her property.7" The day the case was to go to
trial, the State announced Ford would be unavailable to testify, although it
is clear the State did make an effort to produce her.79 The transcript was
admitted pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Evidence 804(b)(1)."°
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether the prior
testimony possessed the "indicia of reliability" required by the Sixth
Amendment.' Citing the relevant United States Supreme Court authorities,
the court observed that the question of the admissibility of former testimony
rests upon the circumstances in which it was taken. 2 Beside the procedural
steps observed during the preliminary hearing, such as the swearing of
witnesses and the maintenance of a record, the "indicia of reliability" inquiry
focused mainly on the defendant's opportunity to develop the witness's
testimony and the defendant's motive for doing so.8" Here, the court stated
there was no indication that a transcript was taken at the request of the
judge." Moreover, the court noted that cross-examination of the witness
was scant and that the witness may have had motive to incriminate one over
the other because one of the defendants was her former boyfriend.85 Even
though both defendants were represented by counsel at the preliminary
hearing, the court reasoned that there might be sound reasons not to exercise
the right of cross-examination. 6 Finally, the State did not notify the
76. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
77. 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110 (1981).
78. Id. at 90, 612 S.W.2d at 111.
79. Id. at 91, 612 S.W.2d at 111.
80. Id. at 91, 612 S.W.2d at 112.
81. Id. at 92, 612 S.W.2d at 112.
82. Id. at 92-93, 612 S.W.2d at 112-13 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (ordered as provided)).
83. Id. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 94, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
86. Id. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting strategic decisions not to engage in cross-examination at a prelimiary hearing as
a reason to question the reliability of testimony given there).
The court also noted that preliminary proceedings for criminal matters are
constitutionally sound if they comply with the terms as listed in the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Scott, 272 Ark. at 94, 612 S.W.2d at 113. The court hastened to note
that a hearing is described as an "informal, non-adversarial" hearing intended to determine
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defendant of its intent to use the prior testimony at trial as required by
section 16-85-210 of the Arkansas Code.87
When analyzing whether Ford's prior testimony could be admitted in
the criminal trial, the court then reviewed two decisions from other states.
In People v. Smith,ss the Colorado Supreme Court held that prior testimony
at a criminal probable cause hearing can never be admitted at trial when the
witness later becomes unavailable. 9 Rejecting the Colorado approach
outright,9" the Arkansas Supreme Court instead held that admissibility
depends on the circumstances surrounding the prior hearing.9' In Fisher v.
Commonwealth,92 a Virginia court concluded that a preliminary hearing was
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement for a "full-fledged
hearing" when the witness whose testimony was sought was subject to
vigorous cross-examination.
93
After reviewing these authorities from other states, the Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case approach to the question.94 In
applying that approach, the court held that the requirements of "opportunity"
and "motive" to develop testimony, as required by Arkansas Rules of
Evidence 804(b)(1), were not sufficiently present to characterize the
only whether the accused should be detained pending further proceedings. Id.; ARK. R.
CRIM. P. 8(c). The court therefore indicated that hearings conducted pursuant to this rule
"might or might not" be full-fledged hearings required by Green. Scott, 272 Ark. at 94, 612
S.W.2d. at 113.
87. Scott, 272 Ark. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-210 allows a
witness to be examined by either party on application made for that purpose when the
magistrate has reasonable grounds to believe the witness will not appear at trial. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-85-210 (Michie 1987). The state failed to show it had complied with the
requirements in this statute. Scott, 272 Ark. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
88. 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979).
89. Id. at 208.
90. Scott, 272 Ark. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 114.
91. Id. at 92, 612 S.W.2d at 112. Other states have adopted a similar fact-based
standard for determining the admissibility of prior testimony in criminal trials. For example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a defendant who was unaware of a
witness's prior inconsistent statement to police did not have adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness on that issue during the preliminary hearing and was therefore
predjudiced when that testimony was admitted at trial. Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614
A.2d 684, 687 (Pa. 1992). The court so held in the context of a prior Pennsylvania decision
that upheld the admissibility of former testimony when the defendant was represented by
counsel at the preliminary hearing and had the opportunity for full cross-examination.
Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 568 A.2d 924 (Pa. 1990).
Likewise, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case basis to determine the
admissibility of prior testimony in Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1985).
92. 232 S.E.2d 798 (Va. 1977).
93. Id. at 802.
94. Scott, 272 Ark. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
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preliminary hearing in Scott as "full-fledged."95 Hence, testimony given at
that preliminary hearing was inadmissible at the subsequent criminal trial.96
The court reasoned that it was unclear whether the defendant would even
have had the right to cross-examine the witness extensively at the prelimi-
nary hearing. 97 Also, the court looked to Rule 8 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which describes probable cause hearings as "informal
and non-adversarial. 98  Although this provision in the Rules does not
preclude a finding that the hearing is "full-fledged," it did indicate that
detailed inquiries into the merits of the case are not contemplated at the
preliminary hearing, and the record from the preliminary hearing in Scott
lacked the information needed to demonstrate that a full-fledged hearing
took place. 99 This finding rendered the testimony from the preliminary
hearing inadmissible."° Additionally, the court decided that the motive to
develop testimony at the preliminary hearing was unlike the one at trial
because of the limited scope of the preliminary hearing. '0'
More recently, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court did allow
testimony from a preliminary criminal proceeding to be admitted into
evidence at the subsequent criminal trial. 2 In Scroggins v. State, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that testimony presented against a defendant
at a hearing to suppress evidence before trial was admissible at a defen-
dant's criminal trial. 3 Several key factors distinguished this case from Scott.
First, the prior testimony was given at a hearing in which witnesses were
sworn and a record was made."° Also, the hearing was held upon motion
of the defense.'05 The defendant was represented by counsel, who not only
cross-examined the witness, but also extensively cross-examined beyond the
original scope of the hearing to consider the question of suppression."° The
court concluded that these factors united to provide the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis upon which to determine the truth, and thus the prior
testimony was admissible.0 7 Clearly, prior to the Hamblen decision,
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 94, 612 S.W.2d at 113 (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8(c)).
99. Id. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 114.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
102. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993).
103. Id. at 111, 848 S.W.2d at 403.
104. Id. at 111-12, 848 S.W.2d at 403.
105. Id. at 111, 848 S.W.2d at 403.
106. Id. at 112, 848 S.W.2d at 403.
107. Id. at 115, 848 S.W.2d at 404-05.
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Arkansas courts had used the fact-specific rule established in Scott to arrive
at divergent conclusions.
IV. REASONING IN HAMBLEN
In Hamblen v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held testimony
from a probable cause hearing regarding the continuation of an emergency
custody order admissible in the father's subsequent criminal trial for child
abuse." 8 The court so held even though Hamblen was not represented by
counsel, as was the defendant in Scroggins.' Additionally, Hamblen
conducted no cross-examination on the testimony later admitted against him
at his criminal trial, as had the defendant in Scroggins."
0
The court based its decision upon five factors which led it to conclude
that Hamblen's right to confront the witnesses against him was not
compromised."' First, the court noted that Hamblen was informed of his
right to counsel and agreed to proceed without counsel." 2 Hamblen stated
that he would like to have counsel appointed for him, but he had previously
been denied indigent status for the criminal proceedings." 3  Second,
Hamblen was told that he would be criminally charged in this same matter
and that he had the right not to testify, as any testimony he would give
would be used against him in the criminal trial." 4 Third, Hamblen had the
opportunity to cross-examine Reams's statement that he shook the child, but
108. Hamblen v. State, 44 Ark. App. 54, 61, 866 S.W.2d 119, 122 (1993). The
emergency custody order placed the father's child in the custody of the Arkansas Department
of Human Services. Id.
109. Id. at 60, 866 S.W.2d at 122.
110. Id. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. The view that prior testimony not subject to cross-
examination can be admitted later at trial is not unprecedented, as federal courts have
determined that only the opportunity to cross-examine need be available. See supra notes
36-41 and accompanying text. State courts have come to similar conclusions. In State v.
Gonzales, the New Mexico Supreme Court admitted testimony in a criminal trial when the
defendant's counsel waived the defendant's right to cross-examination for tactical reasons at
the preliminary hearing. 824 P.2d 1023, 1029 (N.M. 1992).
111. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122.
112. Id. at 60, 866 S.W.2d at 122.
113. Id. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 120.
114. Id. at 57, 866 S.W.2d at 120-21. One must note, however, that although the court
advised Hamblen that his own testimony could later be used against him in a criminal trial,
neither the opinion nor the brief and abstract for appellant indicates that the judge informed
Hamblen that the testimony of others could be used against him in the criminal proceedings,
or of the importance of cross-examining witnesses who give testimony unfavorable to his
defense in the criminal matter. Therefore, the judge's warning in this matter served more
to prevent trial error in the criminal trial on Fifth Amendment grounds than to preserve the
defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.
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he declined to do so." 5  Fourth, having satisfied the "opportunity"
requirement, Hamblen also had similar motives in developing testimony at
the juvenile court proceeding: (1) avoiding the "implication of child abuse,"
(2) avoiding possible conviction of child abuse, and (3) avoiding losing
custody of his child." 6 Fifth, Reams's statements were reliable," 7 as her
testimony was adverse to her desire to maintain custody of her child."' For
these reasons, the court concluded that the circumstances of the juvenile
court's probable cause hearing and protection of Hamblen's rights were not
significantly different from those available at trial; therefore, Reams's prior
statements were sufficiently reliable to admit into evidence at Hamblen's
criminal trial." 9
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Court of Appeals, in Hamblen, applied the same fact-
based "circumstances surrounding the hearing" test as it had in Scott.
Nevertheless, they arguably reached the opposite conclusion. In Hamblen,
ironically, the prior testimony was admissible despite some key factual
differences from Scott that would suggest there was even less reason to hold
the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights adequately protected. First, the
defendant was represented by counsel in Scott; Hamblen was not. Second,
a party to the action cross-examined, to some extent, the challenged
115. Id. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. Here again, the issue whether the unexercised right
to cross-examine the adverse witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies a defendant's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights was reserved by the United States Supreme Court
in Ohio v. Roberts; therefore, the constitutionality of the precise fact scenario presented in
Hamblen has yet to be determined by the United States Supreme Court.
Other courts have held, however, that the mere opportunity to cross-examine, though
unexercised, is sufficient to allow the prior testimony to be admitted at the later proceeding.
See, e.g., People v. Zapien, 846 P.2d 704, 729 (Cal. 1993).
116. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122.
117. Id. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 121. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 71, 89 (holding
that defendant's statement, due to its spontaneity and its tendency to be against his penal
interest, was sufficiently reliable to submit it to a jury absent confrontation). It could be
argued, however, that Reams's statements were consistent with her penal interest--not being
named a co-defendant in the ensuing criminal matter.
118. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122. At the time of the juvenile court
hearing, Reams shared a residence with Hamblen. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 83,
Hamblen (No. CACR-92-01216). Presumably, this fact made Reams's statement regarding
Hamblen's violent tendencies one against her own interests, as the juvenile court would be
more likely to grant the State's petition to retain custody if her statements were taken as true.
119. Hamblen, 44 Ark. App. at 61, 866 S.W.2d at 122 (citing California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that statements from preliminary hearings are admissible at
a criminal trial if they are given "under circumstances closely approximating those that
surround the typical trial.")).
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testimony in Scott; Reams was not cross-examined in this case. Hamblen
was criminally convicted based, in part, on testimony provided in a civil
proceeding which showed little, if any, characteristics of an adversarial
proceeding. Finally, the use of the prior testimony in Hamblen runs counter
to the express public policy of the State of Arkansas to protect children by
encouraging forthright testimony in juvenile proceedings.'
By contrast, the Scroggins court held such testimony admissible only
after the defendant was actually represented by counsel, after counsel
actually cross-examined the witness whose prior testimony was sought to be
admitted, and after that cross-examination was so thorough that it exceeded
the original scope of the hearing.' 2' It is clear that the juvenile courtI ... _.__ 9_n,-, .,, P+, A-1, C .a o d ,.,,e -I-, -.,. .
nearmg, as defined in section Z 9-/2,-.,-4 of thc Fu a e l - n
nature, as it requires appointment of counsel for indigents, 22 application of
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure," 3 maintenance of a formal record, I 4
and application of the Rules of Evidence. 2 1 It is equally clear from the
record, in Hamblen, that Larry Daniel Hamblen was convicted of child
abuse based in part upon statements made by another person who could
have been prosecuted for the same crime and whose statements were
subjected to no more cross-examination than, "I had [a question] a while
ago, but I done forgot. '
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-518 provides:
It is the public policy of the State of Arkansas to protect the health, safety, and the
welfare of minors within the state. In order to effectuate that policy:
(5)Transcripts of testimony introduced in a child maltreatment
proceeding pursuant to this section shall not be received into evidence
in any other civil or criminal proceeding.
(emphasis added). ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-518 (Michie Supp. 1993).
The limitation of this prohibition to proceedings is governed by ARK. CODE ANN. §§
12-12-501 to -518, which provide for administrative determinations of the presence or
absence of maltreatment. The limitation means that such testimony can be used in custody
proceedings in juvenile court held pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325, as was the case
in Hamblen. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-501 to -508 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-325 (Michie Repl. 1993). One can argue that the public policy in
protecting children by encouraging testimony is the same in both types of proceedings, and
this similarity would seem to add greater weight to excluding the former testimony admitted
in Hamblen.
121. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 111-12, 848 S.W.2d 400, 403 (1993).
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-314(b)(3) (Michie Repl. 1993).
123. § 9-27-314(c) (requiting formal service of process); § 9-27-325(f) (providing the
right to compel the attendance of witnesses).
124. § 9-27-325(d).
125. § 9-27-325(e).
126. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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Although the outcomes in Scott and Hamblen seem difficult to
reconcile, one cannot fully understand the holding in Hamblen without first
examining the significant ways in which juvenile court probable cause
hearings for child custody differ from standard probable cause hearings in
criminal matters. The probable cause in a criminal proceeding rarely
develops a significant adversarial nature because the defense may want to
avoid revealing its theory early in the proceeding. The defense has a
stronger incentive to acquiesce in the probable cause hearing and reserve
ammunition for the trial that will almost surely follow. Therefore, a finding
of probable cause regarding a suspect is routinely the outcome.
Conversely, the immediacy of the outcome in dependent-neglected
probable cause hearings, as compared with criminal probable cause hearings,
bears a stronger incentive for the defendant to make substantive efforts to
prevail, because the accused parent who does not prevail does not take their
child home from the court house. For most people, this is more than just
being charged with a crime. Additionally, because judges remove a child
from his or her parents very reluctantly, it is safe to say that if the court was
willing to take custody of a child on an ex parte order just a few days
before, the state does not need to do much to extend the order pending
adjudication within thirty days. Therefore, the parent who wants to return
home with his or her child has a great motivation to prevail at the
dependent-neglected probable cause hearing, as well as a significant burden
to overcome in showing that the ex parte order should not be continued
pending a full hearing.
Despite these differences in probable cause hearings, the Arkansas
Court of Appeals has taken a bold step in allowing the former testimony at
issue in Hamblen. Hamblen was told of his right to counsel, and he failed
to exercise it, after being denied indigent status for purposes of appointed
counsel. Hamblen was offered the right to cross-examine the adverse
witness and waived it without the presence of counsel. The United States
Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Roberts, left open the question whether a
criminal defendant who is represented by counsel could waive the right of
cross-examination in a preliminary hearing and not suffer a violation of his
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights when the untested testimony
is later admitted into evidence against him at a criminal trial. Hamblen
ventures one step further: not only need the defendant waive his right to
cross-examination, he can also waive those rights without the aid of counsel
in a preliminary hearing in a related civil matter, and his Confrontation
Clause rights still will not be compromised when the testimony is admitted
at a subsequent criminal trial. This holding constitutes a significant
expansion of the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule as
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articulated in Pointer v. Texas,'27 where the Confrontation Clause was
violated when the unrepresented defendant had no "meaningful opportunity"
to cross-examine witness testimony.
128
Given the wealth of medical evidence against Hamblen in this case, it
is doubtful that the testimony of Reams made any significant difference in
his eventual conviction. Nevertheless, the holding in Hamblen does
establish a rule of evidence law that raises the stakes for parents who appear
in juvenile court for probable cause custody hearings. It also begs for a
complete explanation from the bench of the peril faced by parents who
proceed in such hearings without representation by counsel.
Finally, one interesting question remains: Will Hamblen effectively
overturn the Scott and Scroggins holdings?
Joel P. Landreneau
127. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
128. Id. at 406-07.
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